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E. HA oLD HALLOWS
R EORGANIZATIONS based on the foreclosure of mortgages
or the enforcement of other rights by creditors and involv-
ing the organization of a new corporation to acquire the property
commenced to developed in the courts of equity in the latter part of
the nineteenth century. After 1878, until the Panic of 1893 caused the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, there was no composition
section nor in fact any Bankruptcy Act. The procedure was worked
out in the Federal Equity Courts primarily in connection with rail-
roads. There was no other suitable method.
The conventional process of reorganization in equity involves a
receivership proceeding to prevent creditors from enforcing their
claims against the property, a foreclosure and sale to free the property
from the old debts, the purchase of the assets by the creditors or a
part of them and the transfer of these assets to a new corporation
organized for that purpose by the bondholders or stockholders or both.
A creditor's bill in equity is used also because the business of the
corporation can be continued during the reorganization and the credi-
tors restrained from dismembering and harassing it. If there are assets
in more than one state, ancillary receiverships and foreclosures should
be commenced and suits by creditors enjoined. It is important that
the creditor's bill should be filed first so that the corporation may be
put under the protection of the equity court and a friendly receiver
appointed before hostile creditors commence objectionable tactics.
Historically, the purpose of a creditor's suit was liquidation for the
equal benefit of all. It was in theory a collective execution. At first
it could be brought only by a judgment creditor with execution un-
satisfied, but as this requirement delayed the proceedings, the theory
of consent receivership was developed. Under this doctrine, a simple
contract creditor could bring the suit and the corporation could by
consent waive the defense that the remedy at law was adequate.' It
then became the custom for a debtor to have a friendly creditor who
possessed a claim over $3,000 and diversity of citizenship to bring
such a suit. Often the bill was prepared by counsel for the debtor and
thus a receiver was obtained within a very short time. But the credi-
tor's bill and the other equitable forms, as they developed, became a
proceeding which achieved the result of preserving the properties in-
'In re Application of Konrad (Metropolitan Railroad Cases), 208 U.S. 90,
28 Sup. Ct. 219. 52 L.Ed. 403 (1908).
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tact, of readjusting the debts of the insolvent debtor and of protecting
the property from the inevitable waste and loss of value-which would
have resulted from a multiplicity of suits by creditors and under the
historical purpose of a creditor's bill. To prevent such forced liquida-
tion by the creditors, the debtor usually anticipated the defaults and
all the necessary papers for the proceedings were prepared beforehand.
Counsel for the corporation often was instrumental in organizing com-
mittees for the various classes of creditors and stockholders. It is
advantageous to have as members of the Protective Committees men
who are experienced in financial matters and understand the problems
of the debtor and whose integrity commands the support of the various
creditors. This is a realistic approach, for if nothing is done, self-
appointed Protective Committees would be formed with the results
left to chance.
Regardless of the origin of the Protective Committee, a depositing
agreement must be prepared. There are many different types of such
agreements. Their purpose is to control the rights of the depositing
security holders and to give to the committee sufficient power to act
effectively in the reorganization. Such agreements generally give a
maximum of power to the committee and place it practically in the
position of owners of the securities. Under carefully drawn agree-
ments, the committee has power to purchase the property, if a bond-
holders committee, and to negotiate and adopt a plan of reorganiza-
tion, either proposed by itself or by someone else. It is not unusual
for the Protective Committee to have power to adopt a plan in its
discretion without submitting it to the depositors. Such agreements
must reserve some control to the security holders or the committee will
be unable to secure deposits thereunder.
While the various committees are being formed, the foreclosure
suits are commenced. By bringing the creditor's suit first, the fore-
closure proceedings are drawn into the creditor's suit and the inter-
vention by other creditors controlled. The equity receiver is often
appointed receiver in the foreclosure proceedings. If the corporation
is seeking the reorganization, the foreclosure generally goes uncon-
tested by it. It is usual to have the decree of foreclosure entered before
the adoption of any plan, as dissenters are always disposed to obstruct
the foreclosure at this point in order to secure more favorable treat-
ment in the plan. After the decree is entered, the proposed plan of
reorganization appears, although it has been prepared previously.
While the receiver is operating the corporation and the period of
redemption is running, the negotiation of the plan between the various
conflicting interest goes on until the dominant forces in the reorganiza-
tion have substantially agreed. Seldom is any plan acceptable to all;
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seldom is the plan strictly logical or legally perfect. It is usually the
result of concessions on all sides and emerges as a hybrid compromise
with high hopes and some doubts on the part of its co-authors that
it will enable the distressed corporation or its successor to live another
few years. In the case of railroads, the plan is usually prepared by a
banking or underwriting house acting through reorganization managers.
The formal plan and agreement to reorganize is then prepared. The
purpose of the plan is to give the financial details of the reorganization,
and generally contains a detailed statement of the outstanding indebted-
ness, the amount of cash that is required, a description of the new
securities and a statement of the distribution of the new securities
among the various classes of existing securities. If considerable cash
is required, provision is made for underwriting and the necessary data
of the terms and conditions. The capital structure of the new corpora-
tion is generally set forth in full. There is a statement of the method
and the term of participation in the plan by the various security holders
and what they must do in order to participate. Most plans also con-
tain a provision for modifying either the plan or the agreement so
that any adjustments that are necessary may be made without re-
submitting the plan.
The whole theory of the plan is generally based on the theory of
foreclosure. The property is to be purchased by the committee or
committees in their name or through agents and, under the agreement
to reorganize, to be transferred to a new corporation, which is to issue
the new stock and whose financial set-up presumably is free from the
defects of the old company. The various Protective Committees would
then become owners of the new securities, subject, of course, to the
obligation to distribute them to their depositors. The cash requirements
of the plan to provide for new capital, the expenses of reorganization,
and the non-assenting creditors are generally obtained from the old
stockholders. This is especially true if the Bondholders' Committee is
in control of the reorganization. This additional investment is called
an assessment and it is a condition precedent to participation in the
reorganization by the junior security holders. For this money they
usually receive some form of security, usually stock in the new com-
pany. The plans generally provide for preserving part of the equity,
if any, of the old stockholders as an inducement for them to pay the
assessment.
Cash for the non-assenting lien creditors of the plan is necessary
since they have the right to participate in the sale of the mortgaged
property. If the purchase is to be made by bondholders, there must be
some form of valuing the property to ascertain the value of the rights
of the non-assenting bondholders and whether there is any surplus
19401,
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equity for general creditors or stockholders. The foreclosure sale
accomplishes this as it does in any other mortgage foreclosure. Since
there is no possibility of any real competitive cash bidding for a large
corporation, the court customarily fixes an upset price, which is the
minimum at which the property can be purchased. Much delay and
litigation is involved in establishing an upset price. Practically it must
be high enough so as not to be unfair to non-assenting bondholders
and yet not so high that the distributive share of the non-assenters will
impose a too serious burden upon the reorganization.
In the early cases it was usual to establish the upset price on the
theory of liquidation and consistent with the theory of a foreclosure,
and thus force or induce the creditors to assent to the plan, wherein
their rights or at least those of the junior security holders were recog-
nized on some theory of going value of the assets.
Up to 1913 when the Boyd case 2 was decided, the plan of reorgani-
zation and the agreement to reorganization were not regarded by law-
yers as being an essential part of the legal proceedings. They were
rather an outside force that determined the course of the receivership
and the foreclosure proceedings, but were not judicially embraced
within them. The court took little notice of the plan and regarded the
foreclosure sale as settling the rights of the parties, the petitioner
taking free from the claims of the old corporations, stockholders or
creditors. The Boyd case, however, recognized the real function of the
foreclosure sale as only a step in the reorganization proceedings, rather
than as an adjudication of rights. In the dictum of the Boyd case, the
court enunciated the principle that equitable relief would not be
afforded to a creditor who had rejected a "fair offer" under the plan
and had refused to come into a "just reorganization." It then became
the practice of hearing objections to the proposed plan before the con-
firmation of the sale. If the plan was unfair to any class of creditors,
the sale was not confirmed; but if the court approved the fairness of
the plan, it confirmed the sale and enjoined later suits by creditors to
reach the transferred property.
The Boyd case is perhaps the most important and most discussed
case on corporate reorganization in equity. Most of the objections of
creditors to a plan have been based on its decision or dicta. This case
of the Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Boyd, arose out of the
Northern Pacific reorganization of the 1890's. The plan under which
the properties were sold refunded the secured indebtedness and gave
participation to stockholders who contributed a cash assessment. It
made no provision for unsecured creditors. The reorganization was
primarily a bondholders reorganization based upon a foreclosure of
2 Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554, 57 L.Ed.
931 (1912).
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the mortgage. The outstanding bonds and receiver's certificates
amounted to $157,000,000. The property was sold at the foreclosure
sale and confirmed for $61,500,000, and a new company was capitalized
for a total of $345,000,000, consisting of $190,000,000 in bonds,
$75,000,000 in preferred stock and $80,000,000 in common stock. The
preferred stockholders were given 50% in new common stock on the
payment of $10.00 per share. The common stockholders received 100%
new common stock upon a payment of $15.00 per share assessment.
The total assessment aggregated $11,000,000. The unsecured creditor's
committee was unsuccessful in defeating the foreclosure action on the
ground of conspiracy between the bondholders and stockholders to
squeeze them out. The Circuit Court held that the assets were insuffi-
cient to pay the mortgage debt and there was therefore no equity in
the property for the unsecured creditors.3
About ten years later, while the new company was prospering,
Boyd, the owner of a judgment for an unsecured claim against the old
company, sued both the old and the new company seeking to subject
the property of the new company acquired through the foreclosure to
payment of his debt. Boyd claimed the foreclosure sale was invalid
because it was made pursuant to the plan of reorganization between
the bondholders and the stockholders, which made no provision for
the payment of unsecured creditors, although the stockholders retained
their interest by receiving shares in the new company. The United
States Supreme Court in a five to four decision sustained Boyd and
granted him a lien on the property of the old company in the hands
of the new corporation, subject to the mortgage placed thereon at the
time of reorganization.
The theory of the majority of the court was that while the bond-
holders might have purchased the property covered by the mortgage
and kept it for themselves to the exclusion of the unsecured creditors
and stockholders, they could not provide for participation in the new
company by the stockholders even at the expense of paying an assess-
ment without making a fair and equitable provision for the unsecured
debts, which would recognize their priority to the interest of the stock-
holders. The court said on page 504:
"The property was a trust fund charged primarily with the
payment of corporate liabilities. Any device whether by private
contract or judicial sale under consent decree, whereby stock-
holders are preferred before creditors, was invalid."
And on page 507:
"The invalidity of the sale flowed from the character of the
reorganization agreement regardless of the value of the prop-
3Paton v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 85 Fed. 838 (E.D. Wis. 1896).
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erty, for in cases like this, the question must be decided accord-
ing to a fixed principle, not leaving the rights of the creditors
to depend upon the balancing of evidence as to whether on the
day of sale the property was insufficient to pay prior encum-
brances."
And continuing on page 508:
"This conclusion does not, as claimed, require the impossible
and make it necessary to pay an unsecured creditor in cash as a
condition of stockholder retaining an interest in the reorganized
company. His interest can be preserved by the issuance, on equi-
table terms, of income bonds or preferred stock. If he declines
a fair offer he is left to protect himself as any other creditor of
a judgment debtor, and, having refused to come into a just
reorganization, could not thereafter be heard in a court of equity
to attack it."
Taking the Boyd case, together with the subsequent cases of the
Kansas City Terminal Railway Co. v. Central Union Trust Co.4 and
Kansas City Southern Railroad Co. v. Guardian Trust Co.,5 the follow-
ing principles are established:
1. The question whether the creditor has received what he is
entitled to as compared with the stockholder is decided by inquiring
whether the plan gives him an advantage over the stockholders such
as reasonably corresponds with the advantage to which he originally
was entitled, regardless of the sale price in the foreclosure. This advan-
tage extends even to prospective value accruing from the plan.
2. A complaining creditor is not barred by decree, sale, confirma-
tion or conveyance which results from a plan and agreement to which
he is not a party, even though the plan was affirmed, nor is he barred
by orders requiring creditors to file claims.
3. A very great delay in asserting the creditor's claim against the
reorganized company does not under the circumstances of the Boyd
case amount to laches.
These principles apply in favor of a security holder of any claims
who by a like process has been refused an equitable advantage over a
junior security holder. This seems to follow from Southern Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Bogert6 and Guaranty Trust Co. v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad Co.7
The Boyd case condemns plans other than those which result in
a freeze-out. Mere participation in a plan is not sufficient. While it is
not necessary to pay cash to the junior security holders or unsecured
4271 U.S. 445, 46 Sup. Ct. 549, 70 L.Ed. 1025 (1925).
5240 U.S. 166, 36 Sup. Ct. 334, 60 L.Ed. 579 (1915).
6250 U.S. 483, 39 Sup. Ct. 533, 63 L.Ed. 1099 (1918).
7 238 Fed. 812 (E.D. Mo. 1916).
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creditors, their priorities of income and liquidation position must be
recognized in the new set-up.
However, there is a recognized exception in the Boyd case, which
justifies the stockholders' participation in a plan of reorganization to
the extent to which they have contributed new money to the company.
This is justified by the need of the corporation for cash to pay the
receivership costs, to pay dissenting creditors and to provide working
capital for the reorganized corporation. Consistently with the Boyd
case, this amount of fresh capital may be represented by securities in
the new corporation which could not be subject to the demands of the
creditors, but the exception goes farther. When a corporation is
embarrassed, new money is not readily available from an outside
source without an offer of adequate security. Since ordinarily a re-
organization looks to scaling down the mortgage debt, the required
funds can be best secured from the stockholders who may be induced
to contribute fresh money in order to salvage their old investment.
As a practical matter, stockholders will not invest new money on junior
securities representing merely the amount of their contribution, and
they must therefore be given participation in excess of that amount.
Such added participation may be defended on the ground that only
through the receipt of the new money is liquidation avoided and the
excess of the going value over the forced-sale-value of the assets
preserved for the creditors.
Generally bondholders do not want to run the property and are
incapable of doing so. The creditors to secure the cooperation of the
management are usually willing to sacrifice part of their investment to
induce the old stockholders and management to continue in the enter-
prise, but in order to give this added participation to the stockholders
the security holders of prior rank must be given participation on terms
more favorable than those to the stockholders. Whether the principles
of the Boyd case or the principles underlying compositions are applica-
ble to proceedings under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act is a con-
troversial question which is outside of the scope of this paper. A good
article, however, on the problem is found in 51 Harvard Law Review
1408.
In one important case, Phipps v. Chicago Rock Island & Pacific
Railway," a reorganization in equity was accomplished by decree with-
:ut sale. In the Rock Island case the question raised was whether the
equity court had the power to compel non-assenting unsecured credi-
tors to accept stock or securities for their claims instead of cash and
thus avoid a judicial sale. The court held that it had such power and
went to the extent of returning the property in receivership to the old
284 Fed. 945 (C.C.A. 8th, 1922).
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corporation and imposing upon the dissenting minority of unsecured
creditors a plan of reorganization approved by the court without a
cash alternative to which the creditors would have been entitled had
the property been sold. If the principle of this case is correct, it might
well be extended to secured creditors. However, doubt has been ex-
pressed on the soundness of the decision. The case was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, but was not passed upon because the
appeal was dismissed upon stipulation. In passing, it is to be noted,
however, that the principle of the case was codified in the reorganiza-
tion sections of the Bankruptcy Act.9
It can be seen from this brief recital that the equity method had
many disadvantages. At times it became an expensive necessity. It
was somewhat cumbersome where ancillary suits were necessary. The
looseness of the method allowed abuses both by the debtor and by
recalcitrant security holders. It was especially defective in that there
was no efficient and expeditious way of binding dissenting minorities
to a fair plan. Hold-ups, confusion, delay and uncertainty were present.
There was no effective way to investigate and prosecute the manage-
ment for misfeasance and mismanagement. In many cases there was
no inclination on the part of the receiver to do so.
There was a distinct need not only for reform but also for advance-
ment of the technique of reorganization. The advancement came not in
granting more power or regulating the procedure in the courts of
equity but, for constitutional reasons, as amendments to the Bank-
ruptcy Act, and like most other important amendments it took a panic
and a depression to bring it about.
9 11U.S.C.A. M 529, 616, 621 (Supp. 1938) (Chandler Act, Ch. X, §§ 179, 216,
221).
